B. Whether a Personal Property is the Formal Reason of Terminating the Union of the Human Nature with the Word

211. As to the other principal article [n.164] of the question, namely the formal reason of terminating this union, those who would say that this union exists because of the assumer containing in himself the perfection of the reality of the created supposit [e.g. William of Ware, supra n.18] and because of the obediential potency in the assumed nature [an opinion Scotus favors, supra nn.46-47, 138], would have to say that the essence is the proper reason of terminating this union, as was argued in relation to this question in the first argument [n.154].

212. But this supposition seems false, because this dependence is of a different idea from the dependence of caused on cause; and the virtual containing that is in the term and the obediential potency that is in the dependent nature pertain to the dependence of caused on cause. Hence for these reasons I did not posit in the first question that the Word can terminate this dependence, but that it is because of independent subsistence [n.84].

213. I say     therefore that the essence is not the formal reason of terminating this union; rather the personal property is.

214. I prove this as follows: in whatever supposit there exists the formal reason of terminating this union, that supposit terminates it; the Father, in whom is the divine essence, does not terminate it; therefore etc     . - Proof of the major: a supposit only terminates because it has the formal reason of terminating, just as a supposit only creates because the formal reason of creating belongs to it; and for this reason any supposit that has in it the proximate formal reason of creating creates; hence the three persons necessarily create simultaneously.

215. The statement is made [by Giovanni de Mincio] that the property is the reason of terminating as the sine qua non.

216. Against this: whatever supposit has in it the formal reason of acting acts according to that reason, or at least can act according to that reason, and prior in nature to the action being actually elicited or to the term being produced; and this is, for it, the reason and principle of acting,a as was made clear frequently in Ord. 1 [d.2 nn.221, 226, 235, 237, 300, 302]; and, on this account, it is in this way that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit, because they have inspiriting force, and both are prior in origin to the Holy Spirit’s being inspirited [cf. Ord. 1 d.12 nn.36, 62]; and for this reason too the three persons create, so that the power of creating is also for each person the reason of creating and of being able to create, because each of them has it naturally before the creature is produced [cf. Ord. 2 d.1 nn.17-22]. -     Therefore , by similarity: that which is the reason of terminating this union will be, for the one who has it, the reason of terminating before it does terminate, if this reason is naturally had before the union is terminated; but it is certain that this reason is not naturally had by the three persons before this union is brought about; therefore etc     .

a.a [Interpolated note] And it is understood that as the formal reason terminates so does the supposit terminate: if the former terminates actually, then the latter terminates actually, if the former aptitudinally, then the latter aptitudinally, if the former in potency, then the latter in potency. And thus is the conclusion understood. Therefore, by similarity, that it is prior in nature, because the term of one [extreme], especially in the case of [the relation] that is dependence, is not simultaneous, nor is it union, nor is it with the foundation.

     [Second interpolated note] That is precisely: if [the formal reason] is got posteriorly, then [the supposit] does not act by it; similarly, not even if [the supposit] is got simultaneously in nature with the foundation; for then the Son would generate himself.

217. One can respond to the reason [n.214] in another way, that the three persons have the essence in different ways, and because of this different way of having the essence, one person can terminate the union such that the essence is for him the reason of terminating but is not so for the others.

218. Against this [n.217] one can argue in two ways:

First as follows: because since this union is real, it has a real term and has it under a real idea; therefore a relation of reason is not the formal reason of terminating the union (but this way of having the formal reason is only a relation of reason in the essence itself, for otherwise the essence would be really related to itself or to the person); therefore the essence, as so possessed, is not formally the reason for terminating the union, such that the essence, as so possessed, should be the proper reason for terminating the union.

219. Second: because the only distinction in way of possessing the essence is one that pertains to origin; but it is not because of this distinction that one person terminates the union and another person does not, because the distinction would be the same if the Father had been incarnated and not the Son, and yet the Son would not, in that case, have terminated the union as he does now; therefore, because of this distinction (which is necessary), the essence is not for one person the reason of terminating the union (which is contingent) and not for another.